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Article 5

Accusation in a Mirror
Kenneth L. Marcus*
I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most astonishing discoveries in the history of genocide
studies was the Note Relative a la Propagande d'Expansion et de
Recrutement (the "Note"), a mimeographed document found in Butare
prefecture in the wake of the Rwandan genocide. The Note, which
draws from Goebbels, Lenin, and others, is a manual of the rhetorical
methods that could be used to inflame ordinary people to attack their
countrymen.'
For jurists attempting to interpret or apply the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (the "Genocide Convention") 2 and related statutes, 3 this
* President, The Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law: senior research
associate, Institute for Jewish & Community Research. Former Staff Director, U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights (2004 2008). B.A., Williams College, 1988; J.D., University of California at
Berkeley, 1991. This paper was delivered at the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Conference on "Hate Speech, Incitement & Genocide," which the author co-convened with Prof.
Alexander Tsesis. Some sections were presented previously at the Centre for Jewish Studies at
the University of Toronto's conference on "Emerging Trends in Anti-Semitism and Campus
Discourse," co-sponsored by the Canadian Academic Friends of Israel. Gregory Gordon,
Maurice Samuels, Gregory Stanton, Alexander Tsesis, Aryeh Weinberg, and Dennis Ybarra
provided helpful comments, but ultimate responsibility remains with the author.
1. See ALISON LIEBHAFSKY DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE

IN RWANDA 65 (1999) (describing the Note as a detailed analysis of how to use propaganda to
sway the public).
2. For purposes of this Article, the term "genocide" will be used as defined by the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, simply because it is legally binding
on its signatories. The Genocide Convention defines "genocide" as:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (111) A,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/260, at 174 (Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
It should be noted, however, that many commentators have lamented the
narrowness of this definition. See William A. Schabas. Origins of the Genocide Convention:
From Nuremberg to Paris, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 35, 53-54 (2008) (summarizing these

criticisms).
3.

The Rome Convention is also applicable here, as is Article 11 3(c) of the International
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discovery has been illuminating because it demonstrates the
instrumentalities through which propaganda can be used to incite massmurder.4 The Genocide Convention's prohibition of incitement is
central to efforts to prevent genocide, 5 so it is unfortunate that the
Note's principal rhetorical contribution-the method called "accusation
in a mirror" ("AiM")-has yet to receive the attention from legal
scholars 6 and tribunals7 that it deserves. If properly understood, the
concept of AiM could assist jurists in correcting the Genocide
Convention's most conspicuous weakness (i.e., its utter failure to
prevent genocides before the killings occur).8

Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute, which mirrors the Genocide Convention's Article III (b).
See Gregory S. Gordon, "A War of Media, Words, Newspapers, and Radio Stations": The ICTR
Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapter in the InternationalLaw of Hate Speech, 45 VA. J.
INT'L L. 139, 150 (2004) [hereinafter Media Trial] (comparing statutes).
4. DES FORGES, supra note 1. at 57. As Alexander Tsesis has noted, it also demonstrates the
long-term effects of propaganda.
5. The other four acts punishable under the Genocide Convention are genocide, conspiracy to
commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide. and complicity in genocide.
Genocide
Convention, supra note 2. See generally NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION:
ITS ORIGINS AND INTERPRETATION 19-22 (1949), reprintedin 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 315

(2008) (describing both the importance and the ambiguity of the "incitement" provision).
6. Indeed, these issues have been wholly unexamined except for a trilogy of articles by
Gregory Gordon and a single article by Susan Benesch. See Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or
Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide. 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 509 (2008)
(examining accusation in a mirror as one of the techniques used in incitement of genocide);
Gregory S. Gordon, From Incitement to Indictment? ProsecutingIran's Presidentfor Advocating
Israel's Destructionand Piecing Together Incitement Law's Emerging Analytical Framework, 98
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 853, 900 (2008) [hereinafter Incitement to Indictment?] (explaining,
in the context of the "direct element" of incitement, Ahmadinejad's use of accusation in a mirror
to pit the Hutus against the Tutsis); Media Trial. supra note 3. at 186-87 (discussing how the
Rwandan government appeared to use accusation in a mirror as a propaganda technique); Gregory
S. Gordon, Music and Genocide: Harmonizing Coherence, Freedom and Nonviolence in
Incitement Law. 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 607, 609 (2010) [hereinafter Music and Genocide]
(describing the failure of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to build upon the
framework for incitement law that had otherwise begun to take shape).
7. Gregory Gordon has repeatedly taken the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR") to task for failing to properly explain the significance of accusation in a mirror. See

Music and Genocide, supra note 6, at 638 (challenging the ICTR for failure to keep track of
incitement techniques, such as accusation in a mirror): Media Trial, supra note 3, at 186-87
(criticizing the ICTR for failing to consider an analysis of accusation in a mirror when issuing the
Aahimana judgment).
8. See W. Michael Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims: PreventingandArresting
Mass Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 57, 78 (2008) ("For anyone who is horrified by the
prevalence of mass killing on our planet and expects the institutions of international law in the
twenty-first century to act-or to authorize someone to act-to prevent or arrest it. the legal
situation is not encouraging."): Michael P. Scharf & Brianne M. Draffin, Foreword: To Prevent
and to Punish: An InternationalConference in Commemoration of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the
Genocide Convention, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2008) (lambasting the Genocide
Convention's "utter irrelevance" in the face of genocidal crimes committed subsequent to its
passage).
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The basic idea of AiM is deceptively simple: propagandists must
"impute to enemies exactly what they and their own party are planning
to do." 9 In other words, AiM is a rhetorical practice in which one
falsely accuses one's enemies of conducting, plotting, or desiring to
commit precisely the same transgressions that one plans to commit
against them. For example, if one plans to kill one's adversaries by
drowning them in a particular river, then one should accuse one's
adversaries of plotting precisely the same crime. As a result, one will
accuse one's enemies of doing the same thing despite their plans.,, It is
similar to a false anticipatory tu quoque: before one's enemies accuse
one truthfully, one accuses them falsely of the same misdeed."
This may seem an unlikely means of inciting mass-murder, since it
would intuitively seem likely not only to fail but also to backfire by
publicly telegraphing its speakers' malicious intentions at times when
the speakers may lack the wherewithal to carry out their schemes.12
The counter-intuitiveness of this method is best appreciated when one
grasps that its injunctions are to be taken literally. There is no
hyperbole in the Note's directive that the propagandist should "impute
to enemies exactly what they and their own party are planning to do."I 3
The point is not merely to impute iniquities that are as bad as the
misdeeds that the propagandist's own party intends. Instead, AiM is the
more audacious idea of charging one's adversary with "exactly" the
misdeeds that the propagandist's party intends to commit. But why, out
9. DES FORGES. supra note 1. at 66.
10. As Alison Des Forges explains in her authoritative examination of the Note that presents a
detailed analysis of Psycholohie de la publiciciti et de la propaganda that "[a propagandist]
advocates using lies, exaggeration, ridicule, and innuendo to attack the opponent. in both his
public and his private life." Id The propagandist suggests that "moral considerations are
irrelevant, except when they happen to offer another weapon against the other side." Id. A
propagandist "must persuade the public that the adversary stands for war, death, slavery.
repression, injustice, and sadistic cruelty." Id The propagandist then suggests two techniques
that would later be used in the Rwanda genocide. Id. The first is to create phony events that
could be used later to give credence to propaganda. Id. The second is AiM: "In this way. the
party which is using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror." Id
I1. The tu quoque argument attempts to defeat an opponent's position by claiming that the
opponent has failed to comply with that position. Also known as an appeal to hypocrisy, the tu
quoque argument is a type of logical fallacy and may be considered to be a form of argumentum
ad hominem.
12. The intuition is that an Adolf Hitler who plans to destroy a particular ethnic population en
route to global domination should not go around talking about ethnic destruction and world
domination before he has the wherewithal to pull it off. Yet this is precisely what Hitler did, see
infra Part II.B (describing the actions taken by Hitler to reach his goals). and others have done it
too. Some readers have challenged this intuition on the ground that the technique relies upon lies
that the listener will not be able to detect. But why is it so clear that the listeners will not be able
to see through the lies? Some, if not all, of the lies described are rather incredible. The point here
is that the success of these lies is counter-intuitive.
13. DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 66 (emphasis added).
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of all of the serious allegations that one might level at one's enemy,
should one accuse the adversary of precisely the wrongs that one's own
party intends to commit? After all, the risks are apparent. By revealing
the propagandist's own intentions, AiM deprives the propagandist's
party of the advantages of speed and surprise and gives the adversary an
opportunity to anticipate and prepare. At the same time, this method
provides independent observers and subsequent judicial tribunals with
evidence of intent. Moreover, AiM is not based on any evaluation of
what misdeeds are most plausibly ascribed to the enemy, such as those
that are based on traditional stereotypes, defamations, or actual
culpability, since it relies instead on the plans of the propagandist's
party.
Despite its counter-intuitive nature, AiM has proven to be one of the
central mechanisms by which genocidaires publicly and directly incite
genocide, in part because it turns out to be quite effective. Once AiM's
structure and functions are understood, its pervasive and efficacious
presence can be discerned not only in mass-murder but also in a host of
lesser persecutions. These qualities can make AiM an indispensable
tool for identifying and prosecuting incitement.
The Genocide Convention criminalizes "direct and public incitement
to commit genocide,"l 4 regardless of whether actual genocide occurs. 15
Nevertheless, actionable incitement must be a direct instigation to
commit an act of genocide rather than vague hate speech.16 This
doctrinal element is important because it protects against prosecutions
that would otherwise intrude upon internationally and domestically
recognized norms of free speech. In light of the covert, coded, and
euphemistic manner in which genocidal appeals are generally
communicated, it is often difficult to determine what expressions may
be deemed sufficiently direct. 17 At the same time, it is critical for
judicial bodies to recognize incitement even when it takes such forms
because these bodies will otherwise fail to satisfy the Genocide
Convention's purpose of preventing genocide rather than merely
punishing its perpetrators.' 8 In light of its common usage, false
14. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at 174.
15. William A. Schabas, Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide, 46 MCGILL L.J.
141, 149 (2000).
16. Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 (Can.).
17. See Schabas, supra note 15, at 160 ("The problem with the requirement that incitement be
'direct' is that history shows that those who attempt to incite genocide speak in euphemisms. It
would surely be contrary to the intent of the drafters to view such coded language as being
insufficiently direct.").
18. Some have argued that punishing genocidal crimes will deter potential future genocides.
See, e.g.. Stephen J. Rapp, Achieving Accountabilityfor the Greatest Crines-The Legacy of the
InternationalTribunals,55 DRAKE L. REv. 259, 285 (2007) (explaining the long process that the
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genocidal claims leveled against a vulnerable population should be
deemed to satisfy the Genocide Convention's requirement that
incitement to genocide must be "direct."l 9 This means that they can be
used to demonstrate that certain expressions call for the elimination of
target populations even though they do not do so in explicit terms.
The directness of AiM is hardly obvious: at first blush, it seems
unlikely that a false charge against an adversary-even if maliciously
intended-should be considered a direct incitement to the wrong-doing
that the speaker condemns. Indeed, nothing could seem more indirect.
After all, the speaker need not urge listeners to take any action; yet if
any actions are urged, the actions are likely to be framed in the language
of self-defense or the pursuit of just goals. 2 0 When AiM is properly
understood, it is clear that this rhetorical method, while oblique in its
form, is actually quite direct in operation.21
AiM's directness can be seen in both its widespread usage by
genocidaires and its effectiveness. First, AiM has historically been an
almost invariable harbinger of genocide. As this Article explains, AiM
has been commonly used in atrocities committed by Nazis, Serbs, and
Hutus, among others. This is a peculiar feature, not of genocide, but of
AiM since non-genocidal forms of AiM have also been ubiquitous with
respect to other forms of persecution. This can be seen in what this
Article will describe as the myths of the Indian giver, the black rapist,
and the murderous Jew.
Second, AiM is extraordinarily effective as a means of facilitating
genocide and other forms of persecution. This is largely because of the
manner in which it legitimizes the crimes it describes, but also because
AiM serves at least five other functions, both in genocidal and nongenocidal contexts: to shock, to silence, to threaten, to insulate, and,
finally, to motivate or incite. The extraordinary efficacy of this method,
international community will go through to regulate incitement while arguing that this might be
difficult but it is necessary). This theory, however, has not been supported by the sorry history of
the post-Nuremburg period.
19. The "directness" requirement is explained infra Part IV. The Rome Statute of the ICC
also prohibits direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The Rome Statute has been
criticized for weakening the criminal prohibition against incitement to genocide on the grounds
that "the status of incitement from a crime in its own right to a mode of criminal participation in
genocide."
Thomas E. Davies, Note, How the Rome Statute Weakens the International
Prohibitionon Incitement to Genocide, 22 HARV. Hum. RTS. J. 245, 245 (2009).
20. See Karen Eltis, A Constitutional "Right" to Deny and Promote Genocide? Preempting
the Usurpation of Human Rights Discourse Towards Incitementfrom a CanadianPerspective. 9
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 463, 464-65 (2008) ("[G]enocidal affirmations are increasingly
cast in human rights discourse as a religious right or a right of the oppressed to self-defense or
self-determination, often preceded by the denial of previous atrocities perpetrated against the
vilified group.").
21. See infra Part III.B (explaining how AiM functions).
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combined with the great frequency of its usage, suggests that it should
raise the same flags as the more commonly discussed methods of
demonization and dehumanization. In contrast to these techniques,
however, AiM is more direct in the sense that it communicates a
specific message to its listeners (i.e., do unto others as they would do
unto you).
This Article demonstrates that AiM is sufficiently direct to constitute
incitement to genocide. In Part II, this Article will situate the surprising
ubiquity of AiM, both in modern genocide and in other persecutions.
This is important to understand because it shows two things. On the
one hand, it shows that the technique is sufficiently commonplace to be
readily understood-in its gruesome implications-by its hearers. On
the other hand, this frequency of usage suggests that genocide doctrine
needs to account for it carefully. Part III will show why AiM has
become so commonplace (i.e., because it works). AiM is strikingly
effective, not only at motivating genocide but also at meeting the
perpetrators' psychological needs and fulfilling a number of other
functions necessary to subject a victim population to the prospect of
mass-murder. Part IV will build on these demonstrations, showing that
this widespread and causally effective technique should be considered
sufficiently "direct" to meet the "directness" element for charging
incitement to genocide. Part V will show why other approaches to the
treatment of AiM are either too loose or too stringent.

11.

THE OMNIPRESENCE OF ACCUSATION IN A MIRROR

A. The General Pervasivenessof the Practice
AiM's genocidal directness can be seen first in the frequency with
which it is used as a precursor to mass-murder. As a general rule, the
more frequently a trope is repeated in common discourse, the more
readily its meaning is understood. It is in this sense that Judith Butler
observes, "[I]f a performative provisionally succeeds . . . then it is ...
only because that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force
of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative
set of practices." 22 AiM operates by issuing false claims against a
vulnerable population through repetition in a manner that listeners have
already been primed by prior practices to understand as a call to arms.
AiM has been widespread not only among those who intend to
perpetrate genocide, but also among a wide range of persons who
consciously or unconsciously defame persecuted minorities. This is
illustrated in the myths of the Indian giver, black racist, and murderous
22.

JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE

51 (1997).
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Jew. 23 Genocide scholars will better understand the concept if they
situate it within a broader domestic and international human rights
context.
Similarly, civil and human rights scholars will better
understand other forms of discrimination and persecution if they can
discern the continuities between domestic defamations and genocidal
murder. 24 The commonness of the technique is important to appreciate,
not only because it underscores the need to identify its occurrence in
genocidal and pre-genocidal contexts and to respond with appropriate
alacrity, but also because it underscores how critical it is for courts to
recognize its relationship to incitement.
B. Pervasiveness in Twentieth Century Genocide
In its genocidal form, AiM has been used and refined by Nazi,
Serbian, and Hutu propagandists. 25 Adolf Hitler, for example, warned
that Jews intended to engage in mass-murder while he devised his own
plans for Aryan domination. 2 6 Similarly, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia observed this phenomenon in
Serbia: "In articles, announcements, television programs and public
proclamations, Serbs were told that they needed to protect themselves
from a fundamentalist Muslim threat .

.

. that the Croats and Muslims

were preparing a plan of genocide against them." 2 7 Indeed, this form of
propaganda has been so widely used as a means of inciting genocide
that it can properly be classified with demonization and dehumanization
as a basic form of genocidal rhetoric. 28
23. See infra Part II.D (exploring the myths of the Indian giver, black racist, and murderous
Jew).
24. Some readers have cautioned that grouping genocidal incitement together with lesser
group defamations could create problems for the freedom of speech. This assumes, however, that
these parallels are drawn for regulatory or punitive purposes. In fact, a better understanding of
the commonness and efficacy of AiM-even in domestic. non-regulable contexts-can advance
our understanding of the consequences of certain forms of communication in ways that have little
to do with criminal prosecution. Among other implications, it may substantiate Alexander
Tsesis's argument regarding the long-term effects of hate speech. See Alexander Tsesis. The
Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Historical Perspective on the
Power of Hate Speech. 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 729, 731 (2000) ("[H]ate speech is not only
dangerous when it poses an immediate threat of harm, but also when it is systematically
developed and thereby becomes part of culturally acceptable dialogue.").
25. Benesch. supra note 6. at 511.
26. ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 65 (Ralph Manheim trans.. Houghton Mifflin 1971)
(1927).
27. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment,
91 (Geneva
Convention. May 7, 1997). available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj705O7JT2
-e.pdf.
28. Dehumanization impugns the target population with impaired biological capacity, while
demonization charges them with a depraved moral condition. See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN.
WORSE THAN WAR: GENOCIDE. ELIMINATIONISM. AND THE ONGOING ASSAULT ON HUMANITY
320 (2009).
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C. Genocide Cases
Some of the most important genocide law cases illustrate the tactic of
AiM, although they discuss it with varying degrees of explicitness. For
present purposes, these cases are interesting not only for their doctrinal
development, but also for their documentation of the relationship
between AiM and incitement to genocide. It is telling that the history of
modern incitement law is virtually coextensive with the modern history
of AiM: incitement is invariably accompanied by AiM in law as it is in
fact.
1. Nazi Genocide: The Nuremburg Trials
Adolf Hitler and the Nazis used AiM against the Jews during Hitler's
rise to power and throughout the Nazi regime. In Mein Kampf, Hitler
charged, "[I]f, with the help of his Marxist creed, the Jew is victorious
over the other peoples of the world, his crown will be the funeral wreath
of humanity and this planet will, as it did millions of years ago, move
through the ether devoid of men." 2 9 The Nazis' AiM technique evolved
in tandem with their human rights abuses leading up to genocide. 3 0
Early on, for example, Nazi propagandist Josef Goebbels wrote about
fictitious Jewish plans to sterilize Germans at a time when Germans
were actually sterilizing thousands of Jewish victims, as well as persons
with various disabilities. 3 1 Later, as the German government escalated
its persecution of Jews to mass-murder, Nazi AiM was similarly
upgraded. 32 Thus, Goebbels asked in a 1941 pamphlet, "Who should
die, the Germans or the Jews? ...

You know what your eternal enemy

and opponent intends for you. There is only one instrument against his
plans for annihilation." 3 3
The International Military Tribunal ("IMT") at Nuremberg provides a
window into some of the Nazis' AiM technique, although Hitler and
many other Nazi perpetrators were able to avoid prosecution for their
crimes. The IMT tried two defendants, Julius Streicher, 34 editor of the
notoriously anti-Semitic Nazi tabloid Der Stiirmer, and senior Nazi
propaganda official Hans Fritzsche, for acts that today would be
29. HITLER, supra note 26, at 65.
30. See Benesch. supra note 6. at 505 (asserting that as the genocide expanded, so too did
AiM).
31. See id. (noting that Goebbels emphasized the Jews' fictitious plan to sterilize the Germans
in his newspaper articles).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG GERMANY, PART 10. at I (H.M.
Attorney-General By His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946) (restating the record between the
president of the tribunal and Streicher's defense counsel, Dr. Marx).
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charged incitement to genocide. 3 5 Since the Nuremburg trials preceded
the Genocide Convention, the defendants were alternatively tried
instead for crimes against humanity. 36 Both Streicher and Fritzsche had
engaged in AiM. 37 Streicher, for example, accused the Jews of
harboring genocidal intent against the Germans, writing in May 1939
that the Jews must be exterminated precisely for this reason:
A punitive expedition must come against the Jews in Russia. A
punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for them that
every murderer and criminal must expect. Death sentence and
execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be
exterminated root and branch. 38
Fritzsche, head of the German Propaganda Ministry's Radio Division,
was accused of falsifying news to incite the German people to commit
atrocities. 39
Although Streicher denied that he was advocating the literal killing of
Jews, prosecutors established that he had continued his incitement after
he knew that thousands of Eastern European Jews had been
slaughtered. 40 Streicher was ultimately convicted by the Nuremburg
tribunal and executed in what has been called "the most famous
conviction for incitement.",41 Fritzsche, by contrast, was acquitted at
Nuremburg, on the grounds that his language was insufficiently direct
and his intent was insufficiently clear. Specifically, the court found that
Fritzche did not have control over the development of propaganda
policies, but was instead merely a conduit for directives from more
senior officials. 4 2 Nevertheless, a German court later convicted
Fritzsche on similar charges and sentenced him to nine years of hard
labor. 4 3
The German appeals court affirmed the conviction,
emphasizing that Fritzsche had practiced what one might call AiM.44
35. See id. (discussing Streicher's involvements in demonstrations against the Jewish
population).
36. See Benesch. supra note 6. at 509 (explaining that because the crime of incitement to
genocide was not yet known, Streicher and Fritzsche were charged with crimes against
humanity).
37. See id. at 510-11 (asserting that both Streicher and Fritzsche used the AiM technique).
38. Id. at 510 (quoting MARTIN GILBERT, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE
HISTORY 731 (2004)).
39. See id. at 5 10 (discussing Fritzche's accusation and subsequent acquittal).
40. See id. (recognizing that while Streicher claimed that he had only advocated for the
classification of the Jews as aliens, prosecutors were able to show that he had in fact called for the
their extermination by pointing to a series of inciting articles he drafted).
41. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu. Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,
550 (Sept. 2.
1998); Media Trial, supra note 3, at 143.
42. Media Trial, supra note 3, at 144.
43. Benesch. supra note 6. at 511.
44. See id. (recognizing that in affirming the conviction. the court noted that Fritzche
practiced the AiM technique).
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2. Rwandan Genocide 1: The Mugesera Case
Since the Nuremburg Trials, Mugesera v. Canada has become the
leading case on AiM. 45 In this Canadian case, Rwandan politician Leon
Mugesera was charged with inciting his fellow Hutus to massacre the
Tutsis of Rwanda. 4 6 On November 22, 1992, Mugesera delivered a
long, passionate speech to over 1000 Hutus in Kabaya, Rwanda. 47 In
this oration, Mugesera warned the Hutus that they were about to be
exterminated by "inyenzi," a term that has been translated as
"cockroaches," and he urged the Hutus to kill the Tutsis. The next day,
several killings took place nearby. 4 8 Less than a year and a half later,
the Rwandan genocide began in earnest. 4 9 But it was not the Tutsis
who massacred the Hutus. Rather, it was the Hutus who attacked the
Tutsis, killing at least 500,000.50
The AiM technique was used throughout the Rwandan massacre, not
only by Mugesera, but also by other Hutu leaders who falsely accused
Tutsis of plotting precisely the crimes that the Hutus were plotting
against them. 5 1 For example, in 1991, La M6daille Nyiramacibiri
claimed that Tutsis were conspiring to "clean up Rwanda . . . by

throwing Hutu in the Nyabarongo [River]." 52 This accusation would
become infamous when Leon Mugesera leveled it against Tutsis the
following year. 53 The specificity of the accusation is significant
because the Hutus did not merely charge Tutsis with murderous intent;
rather, they accused them specifically of wanting to throw Hutus to their
death in the Nyabarongo. This is a perfect example of inversion,
45. See Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2003). [2004] 1 F.C.
325 (Can. Que. Fed. Ct. App.) (ordering the deportation of Rwandan politician for using speech
to incite people to commit crimes against humanity).
46. See Mugesera v. Canada. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100
(Can.) (discussing how Mugesera used extremely violent language to incite the lutus to
exterminate the Tutsi).
47. See Benesch, supra note 6. at 486 (citing DES FORGES. supra note 1, at 83-86
BroadcastingGenocide: Censorship, Propaganda& State-Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 19901994, ARTICLE 19, 18-20, 38-40 (Oct. 15, 1996) [hereinafter ARTICLE 19], http://www.articlel9
.org/pdfs/publications/rwanda-broadcasting-genocide.pdf (analyzing the Mugesera speech and
deeming it "the most explicit call for violence against Tutsi civilians and H-utu opposition
supporters at that time").
48. Mugesera. [2004] 1 F.C. para. 7.
49. THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONALITIES TO INVESTIGATE THE
1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE SURROUNDING EVENTS, RWANDA:
THE
PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE § 14.20 (1998) [hereinafter PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE], available

at http://www.scribd.com/Report-Rowanda-Genocide/d/45636507.
50. Id. § 14.80.
51. DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 65 (recounting that Iutu leaders often "attributed to Tutsi
the words that Hutu themselves would eventually use in inciting the slaughter of Tutsi").
52. Mugesera, [2004] F.C. para. 227.
53. Id. para. 172.
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considering many Tutsis were thrown to their deaths in the very same
river.
Mugesera's speech is worth considering in detail, as it has become
paradigmatic of AiM. Charging the "inyenzis" with various capital
crimes, such as attempting to demoralize military troops, Mugesera
insisted that capital punishment must be meted out by the people if the
government did not take action:
I should like to tell you that we are now asking that these people be
placed on a list and be taken to court to be tried in our presence. If
they (the judges) refuse, it is written in the Constitution that
'ubutabera bubera abaturage.'
In English, this means that
[TRANSLATION] 'JUSTICE IS RENDERED IN THE PEOPLE'S
NAME.' If justice therefore is no longer serving the eople . . . we
must do something ourselves to exterminate this rabble.

Having urged the Hutus to exterminate the Tutsis because of the
Tutsis' purported criminality, Mugesera added urgency to his charge by
insisting that the Tutsis would otherwise exterminate them. "'Why do
they [the government] . . . not exterminate all of them?' he asked, 'Are
we really waiting till they come to exterminate us?"' 5 5 He insisted the
issue was neither speculative nor distant. "'These people called
Inyenzis,' he emphasized, 'are now on their way to attack us."' 5 6
Moreover, he insisted that this lethal threat was central to the Tutsis'
being, "I am telling you, and I am not lying, . . . they only want to

exterminate us. They only want to exterminate us: they have no other
aim. We must tell them the truth." 5 7 It was precisely to meet this
inverted genocidal threat that Mugesera urged his countrymen, "[W]e
must all rise, we must rise as one man .... 58
After the war, Mugesera moved to Quebec, where some of his
countrymen insisted that the government deport him for inciting
genocide and committing crimes against humanity. The Canadian
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration began deportation proceedings
against him, which were followed by a long and complicated process
through the Canadian immigration and judicial system.
Under
Canadian law, statements constitute incitement to genocide if they are
"1) likely to incite, and 2) are made with a view to inciting the
commission of the offence." 59 An adjudicator determined that the
allegations against Mugesera were valid and issued a deportation order

54. Id. at para. 17 (emphasis added).
55. Id. atpara. 16.
56. Id. at para. 13.
57. Id. at para. 13.
58. Id. at para. 29.
59. Mugesera, [2005] 2 S.C.R. para. 6.

368

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 43

against him, which Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board (Appeal
Division) upheld. Mugesera appealed next to a federal trial court,
which dismissed his application for judicial review on incitement to
commit murder, genocide or hatred, but affirmed with respect to the
allegation of crimes against humanity.
Nevertheless, a Canadian appeals court reversed the lower court's
decision, rejecting the Minister's argument that Mugesera's speech was
an incitement to genocide or a crime against humanity. More broadly,
the court was not convinced that Mugesera was motivated by ethnic
animus or that his intent was to incite murder. 60 However, the court
acknowledged that the prosecution's case could be taken to mean "that
the speech could be very valuable in establishing the presence of a
criminal intent when the perpetrators of the genocide were brought to
justice."61
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed, finding that Mugesera's
speech "was likely to incite, and was made with a view to inciting
murder." 62 The Court held Mugesera culpable for his criminal acts
because he met the two criminal act requirements of incitement: his
words were direct and public. At the same time, the Court held
Mugesera had specific intent, since as an educated and sophisticated
man he must have known the import of his words, which were made at a
public event before a primed audience at a time when ethnic violence
was already occurring. Mugesera's use of AiM was central to this
incitement.
3. Rwandan Genocide 11: The Media Trial
The ICTR's 2003 tribunal decision and 2007 appellate decision in
Prosecutorv. Nahimana, et al., better known as the Media Trial, have
quickly joined the Nuremburg and Mugasera trials in the pantheon of
leading cases on incitement to genocide. 63 For present purposes, the
Media Trial is particularly important because the trial featured
considerable testimony on AiM. The three Media Trial defendants were
all prominent Rwandan media figures: Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and
60. See Mugesera, [2004] F.C. paras. 44, 58 (arguing that there was nothing in the record to
suggest that the massacres that took place were coordinated and for a common purpose. nor was
there any evidence in the record that Mugesera's speech "was part of any strategy whatever").
61. Id. para. 43.
62. Mugesera, [2005] 2 S.C.R. para. 7 (stating that the elements of the actus reus were met, as
"Mugesera conveyed to his listeners, in extremely violent language, the message that they faced a
choice of either exterminating the Tutsi, the accomplices of the Tutsi, and their own political
opponents, or being exterminated by them").
63. See Media Trial, supra note 3, at 140-41 (pointing out that the Media Trial was the first
case since the trials at Nuremberg to face an international tribunal on the issue of free expression
in the media with respect to genocide).
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Ferdinand Nahimana were founders of the notorious Radio T616vision
Libre des Mille Collines ("RTLM"), also known as "Radio Machete,"
while Hassan Ngeze was editor of the equally discredited newspaper
Kangura.64
Hassan Ngeze, an experienced journalist, edited and published
Kangura (translated as "wake others up"), which was considered the
most popular newspaper in Rwanda for its time. 65 In December 1990,
Kangura ran an article entitled "Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu,"
which described the Tutsis as "bloodthirsty" and warned readers that
Tutsi "infiltrators" were conspiring to seize control of the country and
rule over the Hutus. 6 6 Hutus were encouraged to "take all necessary
measures to deter the enemy from launching a fresh attack." 67 In other
issues, Kangura continued its drumbeat of anti-Tutsi propaganda. 6 8
Here again, a vulnerable population (Tutsis) was described as
"bloodthirsty" in terms that would better describe the views and
intentions of the writer towards that population. In the same way,
Kangura misreported that Tutsi soldiers captured by the government
forces confessed that they "had come to clean the county of the filth of
Hutu," when actually it was the Hutu who frequently spoke of cleansing
their communities of the Tutsi "filth." 6 9 Kangura was not, however,
alone in this approach. In April 1992, the Jyambere newspaper accused
Tutsi parties of arming their youth groups, demonstrating by AiM
precisely what Hutu forces were planning at the time. 70
Ferdinand Nahimana was a prominent historian and university
administrator at the National University of Rwanda before being
appointed to the directorship of the Rwandan Office of Information. In
that position, he oversaw Radio Rwanda, the national radio station, from
1990 until 1992, during which he ordered five Radio Rwanda
broadcasts describing a supposed Tutsi plot to murder several Hutu
leaders. 7 1 Hundreds of Tutsis were murdered because of these
broadcasts, 7 2 which led to Nahimana's termination. 73 Within months of
64. Nahimina v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T. Judgment.
1 (Nov. 28. 2007).
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Nahimana/decisions/071128judgement.pdf;
see
also Media Trial,supra note 3, at 140-41.
65. See Media Trial. supra note 3. at 157 (illustrating that during its publication, the Kangura
newspaper was the most widely read Rwandan newspaper).
66. Aahimana, ICTR-99-52-T, 259.
67. Id.
68. See Media Trial, supra note 3, at 157-58.
The Tutsis were described as being
"biologically distinct" from Hutus due to their bloodthirsty and malicious nature. Id.
69. DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 79.
70. Id.
71. Media Trial, supra note 3. at 158-59.
72. NahimanaJudgnient,ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, 691 (Nov. 28, 2007).
73. Id. 690.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

370

[Vol. 43

his firing, Nahimana co-founded and helped to develop and lead a new
radio station, RTLM, that he hoped would better reflect the views of his
party. 74 During two formal meetings on November 26, 1993, and
February 10, 1994, Rwanda's Minister of Information warned
Nahimana and other RTLM leadership that they were inciting ethnic
violence and hatred against Tutsis. 75 Nevertheless, RTLM continued to
broadcast flagrant propaganda encouraging such animus, including one
notorious episode in which RTLM announced that:
One hundred thousand young men must be recruited rapidly. They
should all stand up so that we kill the Inkotanyi and exterminate them
....

[T]he reason we will exterminate them is that they belong to one

ethnic group.
Look at the person's height and his physical
appearance. Just look at his small nose and then break it. 76
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a lawyer by training, co-founded RTLM
with Nahimana and helped to lead the station while directing the
political affairs function as a senior official of the Rwandan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. 77
If Nahimana was the "top man" at RTLM,
Barayagwiza was considered the "number two." 78 During the time of
the Rwandan genocide, Barayagwiza continued in his position with

RTLM.7 9
The Tribunal's judgment indicated that the Rwandan government had
deliberately and self-consciously used AiM. Alison Des Forges
testified at length about the Note, explaining the significance of its
methods in the Rwandan tragedy, and the Nahimana tribunal describes
Des Forges's testimony regarding AiM in detail. 80 Nevertheless,
Professor Gregory Gordon, who acknowledges the Tribunal's one key
reference to a pre-genocide broadcast that warned of murderous Tutsi
intentions, criticizes the Tribunal for not adequately analyzing it since:
"[o]ut of the hundreds of RTLM tapes introduced into evidence, one
might expect to find genocide-period passages where Tutsis were
falsely accused of committing or planning to commit against Hutus the
types of atrocities extremist Hutus were actually committing against
Tutsis." 8
Ngeze, Barayagwiza, and Nahimana were all convicted of genocide,
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, conspiracy to commit

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. f 489-90; Media Trial, supra note 3. at 159.
Nahimana Judgment,ICTR-99-52-T.
573-607: Media Trial. supra note 3, at 161-62.
Aahimana Judgment,ICTR-99-52-T, 396.
Id. 6; Media Trial, supra note 3, at 165.
Nahimana Judgment,ICTR-99-52-T. 511; Media Trial, supra note 3. at 165.
Nahimana Judgment,ICTR-99-52-T. 541-42; Media Trial, supra note 3. at 166.

80.

NahimanaJudgment,ICTR-99-52-T,

81.

Media Trial, supra note 3, at 186-87.
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genocide, and crimes against humanity. 82 Barayagwiza was sentenced
to thirty-five years incarceration, while Ngeze and Nahimana were
sentenced to life imprisonment.8 3
On November 28, 2007, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the
Tribunal's judgment in part, reducing Ngeze's sentence to thirty-five
years' imprisonment, 84 Nahimana's to thirty, 8 5 and Barayagwiza's to
thirty-two.86 The Appeals Chamber concluded that the appellants "were
consciously, deliberately and determinedly using the media to perpetrate
direct and public incitement to genocide." 8 7 Although the appeals court
was no less vulnerable than the original tribunal to Gordon's criticism
that it failed to properly catalog AiM, the appeals court nevertheless
identified this passage in the Kangura as inciteful:
If the Inkotanyi have decided to massacre us, the killing should be
mutually done. This boil must be burst. The present situation warrants
that we should be vigilant because they are difficult.

. .

. It will be

necessary for the majority people and its army to defend itself ....
On that day, blood will be spilled. On that day, much blood must have
been spilled.88
The Appeals Chamber noted that this article contained an appeal to
"the majority people" to kill the Inkotanyi and their "accomplices
within the country" (meaning the Tutsis) in case of an attack by the
RPF. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber found that this article
constituted direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 89
D. Other Examples
To fully grasp the pervasiveness of AiM, it is helpful to consider not
only the handful of well-known twentieth-century genocide cases, but
also the range of other persecutions in which the technique is used. The
contemporary genocidal practice is merely a specific application of a
more general phenomenon. To choose just one current example from
today's newspaper headlines, 90 consider that much of the violent
persecution that Egypt's Coptic Christians now suffer is related to the
continually repeated but unfounded allegation that the Coptic Church is

82. NahimanaJudgment,ICTR-99-52-T.
1105-08: Media Trial. supra note 3, at 140-41.
83. Nahimana Judgement. ICTR-99-52-T.
1105-08.
84. Nahimina v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, Appeal, 1115 (Nov. 28, 2007).
85. Id. 1052.
86. Id. 1097.
87. Id. 73 (Shahabuddeen. J.. partially dissenting).
88. Id. 772.
89. Id.
90. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt's Christians Fear Violence as Changes Einbolden
Islamists, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2011, at Al (highlighting an unconfirmed case where a young
Muslim alleged that Coptic Christians abducted her and tattooed her with a cross).
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abducting and abusing Coptic women who convert to Islam. Ironically,
the opposite is occurring-Egyptian Muslims are kidnapping Coptic
women and forcing them to convert to Islam. 9 1 This is a textbook
example of AiM.
Historically, AiM prefigures many, if not all, of the worst
persecutions that despised groups have faced.
They include, for
example, what will be described below as the myths of the black rapist,
the Indian giver, and the murderous Jew. In each case, the victim is
falsely accused of precisely the crimes that the perpetrator would visit
upon him or her.
Situating AiM within this broader context allows us to better
appreciate its nature, frequency, etiology, and function. In so doing, it
demonstrates that this practice often amounts to a direct, public, and
But at the same time, this
effective means of incitement.
contextualization suggests an inconvenient insight obscured by the
association of the practice with its explicit elucidation in the Note-that
AiM, while sometimes a deliberate propagandistic tactic, also
sometimes expresses an unconscious impulse.
1. The Myth of the Indian Giver
Consider the term "Indian giver" with all that it signifies within
American idiomatic English: the notion that Indians have so frequently,
recklessly, and materially breached their promises to the white man as
to render promise-breaking a defining feature of their characterindeed, a feature so defining of their character as to justify applying the
name to the promise-breaking of all the world's peoples. The Oxford
English Dictionary illustrates that the term has long signified an illusory
form of gift giving. 92
It is not coincidental that promise-breaking is the evil that has been
uniquely visited upon Native Americans by the white man. Indeed, the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights titled its most recent evaluation of
Native American health care policy Broken Promises.93 Even a
91. See CHRISTIAN SOLIDARITY INTL & COPTIC FOUND. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
DISAPPEARANCE. FORCED CONVERSIONS. AND FORCED MARRIAGES OF COPTIC CHRISTIAN
WOMEN IN EGYPT (Nov. 2009) (asserting that the abduction, forcible marriage, and conversion
of Coptic Christian women by Muslim men is considered a crime against humanity); Raymond
Ibrahim. Islamists Project Islam's Worst Traits onto Christians. MIDDLE EAST F. (May 25.
2011), http://www.meforum.org/2915/islamists-project-islam-worst-traits-onto (alleging that the
abduction and conversion of Coptic Christian women by Muslim men is a "notorious
phenomenon in Egypt").
92. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 856-57 (2d ed. 1989) (substantiating the term's long
usage). When the material in this section was first delivered before an international audience in
Toronto, references to the term "Indian giver" were met with blank stares. In the United States.
audiences understand the term completely.
93.

U.S.

COMM'N ON

CIVIL RIGHTS, BROKEN PROMISES: EVALUATING

THE NATIVE
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cursory Google search for the words "broken promises" and "Indians"
yields an extraordinary volume and range of materials documenting
promises broken against Native Americans. 94
The best-known example is the United States's historical breach of
promises with respect to Indian lands. For example, the Northwest
Ordinance ensured Indian tribes that "lands and property shall never be
taken from [the Indians] without their consent[,] and, in their property,
rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in
just and lawful wars authorized by Congress." 9 5 The United States
repeatedly and violently breached this promise. For example, during
the infamous "trail of tears," 96 the United States government compelled
the relocation of Indian tribes located east of the Mississippi River
under the Indian Removal Act.97
The stereotypical view of Indians as promise-breakers-a deeply
entrenched American English idiom-is a classic example of human
rights inversion, or AiM: white North Americans systematically broke
their promises to Native Americans while accusing Indians of precisely
this malfeasance, going so far as to name one form of promise-breaking
after them.
2. The Myth of the Black Rapist
A second example is the myth of the black rapist. This defamation
was so widespread in the Jim Crow South9 8 that it provided a leading
justification-perhaps the leading justification-for the practice of
lynching, 99 which took over 3700 American lives through 1930.100
Many black men accused of raping white women were lynched, when
their only true crime may have been allegedly glancing for a moment
too long at a white woman. 10 1 Unsubstantiated allegations were
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Sept. 2004).

94. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN WARS AND WARFARE 143 (William
B. Kessel & Robert Wooster eds., 2005) ("Disease. broken promises. corruption. and the poor
lands reserved for Indian use decimated Native American populations.").
95. Northwest Ordinance, I Stat. 50 (1787).
96. Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830 1976 The United
States Government's Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution of the Crime of
Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 931 32 (2002).
97. INDiAN REMOVAL ACT OF 1830, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY 52 (Francis Paul Prucha ed.. 3d ed. 2000).
98. See DIANE MILLER SOMMERVILLE, RAPE AND RACE IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
SOUTH 223 (2004) ("The American South's hysterical fear of black men as rapists, often referred
to as the 'rape myth' or 'rape complex,' is well documented and has been memorialized in the
pages of fiction and nonfiction alike for over a hundred years.").
99. This was famously the point of the classic novel To Kill a Mockingbird. HARPER LEE, TO
KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
100. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN. AMERICAN LAWIN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 118 (2002).
101. See SOMMERVILLE, supra note 98, at 224 ("To be a black man accused of raping or
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sufficient because "[w]hite supremacy norms did not permit white
jurors to believe a black man over a white woman ....
Because most
southern white men believed that black males secretly lusted after
'their' women, they generally found rape allegations credible." 102
White men were willing to believe that black males secretly lusted after
and forcibly raped white women because, in numerous cases, they
harbored precisely these same desires and committed exactly these same
crimes against black women.1 03
It is clearly not coincidental that rape was systematically inflicted
upon African-American women throughout and well after the long
period of slavery.1 04 These rapes were almost never punished in the Jim
Crow South.10 5 Until emancipation, black women lacked the right to
bring charges of rape, but some racial distinctions persisted in rape law
well into the later years of Reconstruction. 10 6 As recently as 1867,
Kentucky law defined a rapist as one who shall "unlawfully and
carnally know any white woman, against her will or consent."1 07 Even
with the change in rape law, white men frequently used rape as a
"weapon of terror" against black women in the Reconstruction South. 0 8
3. The Myth of the Murderous Jew
Since ancient times, European anti-Semites constructed the Jew as a
murderous criminal. 109 This defamation was frequently the precursor to
anti-Jewish violence and mass-killings.11 0 This can be seen in historical
examples, such as "blood libel,""' which is the myth that Jews kill
attempting to rape a white woman in the American South was to face certain death, at the hands
of either the executioner or an angry mob.").
102. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 118 (2004).
103. See, e.g.. RANDALL KENNEDY. INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE.
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 178 (2003) ("[T]hroughout the Reconstruction period, violent white
supremacists used rape as a weapon of terror aimed at intimidating or punishing blacks who dared
to read, travel, work for themselves, or pursue politics.").
104. See, e.g., Osagie K. Obasogie, Anything but a Hypocrite. InteractionalMusings on Race,
Colorblindness,and the Redemption ofStrom Thurmond, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 451, 464-69
& nn.37-63 (2006) (describing the widespread rape of African-American women by white
Southern men during the period slavery and throughout the Jim Crow South).
105.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 119.

106. SOMMERVILLE. supra note 98, at 148.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. MARVIN PERRY & FREDERICK SCHWEITZER, ANTISEMITISM: MYTH AND HATE
FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 43-72 (2002).
110. ROBERT S. WISTRICH, A LETHAL OBSESSION: ANTI-SEMITISM FROM ANTIQUITY
TO THE GLOBAL JIHAD 90 (2010).

111. See id. at 88-90 (noting that the term "blood libel" was invented in 1944). The term
arose after the murder of a twelve-year-old Christian boy just before Easter. Id. The crime was
attributed to local Jews without any evidence, with a claim that "the Jews of Norwich bought a
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gentile children for ritual purposes. 112 Since twelfth-century England,
the primary version of the blood libel is that Jews kill Christian babies
in order to use their blood to bake traditional flatbread, or matzah, on
the holiday of Passover. 1 13 Throughout the Middle Ages, the recurrent
false accusation of Jewish ritual murder was invariably followed by the
actual murder of countless Jews. 1 14 The most salient, contemporary
form of the myth of the murderous Jew, however, has been the
Holocaust inversion defamation, which accuses Jews of perpetrating the
crimes that were perpetrated against them. 115 In some cases, the
speaker himself is intending to perpetrate such crimes against Jews,
especially Israeli Jews, in the future.
It has become commonplace in the Middle East for Israel's extremist
adversaries to accuse the Jewish state of harboring genocidal ambitions
while simultaneously urging the destruction of the Jewish state and the
Jewish people. Over the last several years, for example, Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has repeatedly engaged in AiM, 116
insisting that Israelis "have no boundaries, limits, or taboos when it
comes to killing human beings," while simultaneously asserting that
Israel "should be wiped off the map." 117 As if to dispel any ambiguities
about his intentions, President Ahmadinejad paraded a Shahab-3 missile
through the streets of Tehran in 2008 with the message, "Israel must be
wiped off the map."" 8 As historian Robert Wistrich observed, "There
is a compulsive annihilationist dimension to these declarations." 1 1 9
Christian child before Easter and tortured him .... " Id. Ritual crucifixion of a Christian was,
according to claimant Theobald, a way to expedite the coming of the Messiah. Id "The blood
libel was linked . . . to the notion of an international Jewish conspiracy." Id.: ANTISEMITIC
MYTHS: A HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ANTHOLOGY 11-19 (Marvin Perry & Frederick

M. Schweitzer eds., 2008) (collecting historical examples of the blood libel from ancient to early
modern times).
112. WALTER LAQUEUR, THE CHANGING FACE OF ANTI-SEMITISM: FROM ANCIENT
TIMES TO THE PRESENT 55 (2006).

113. See id. at 55-57 (describing this use of the blood libel beginning in 1144).
114. WISTRICH. Supra note 110, at 90.
115. Paul Iganski and Abe Sweiry call this practice "playing the Nazi card." PAUL IGANSKI
& ABE
SWEIRY, EUROPEAN
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY
OF CONTEMPORARY
ANTISEMITISM, UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING THE 'NAZI CARD' (2009).

116. Gordon, From Incitement to Indictment?, supra note 6, at 900-01; Kenneth L. Marcus,
Iran's Nuclear Anti-Zionism Is Genocidal,Not Political, INFocus Q., Winter 2009, available at
http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/1521/iran-nuclear-anti-zionism-genocidal-political;
Kenneth
L. Marcus, Iranian Incitement to Genocide 5 (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://digitalcase.case.edu:9000/fedora/get/ksl:marira00/marira00.pdf.
117. There has been, however. substantial debate over the translations of Ahmadinejad's
pronouncements. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Just How Far Did They Go, Those Words Against
Israel?, N.Y. TIMES, June II, 2006, at WK4 (noting that some translators argue that
Ahmadinejad was calling an end to the Jewish-Zionist state occupying Jerusalem, rather than
calling for Israel to be wiped off the map).
118. Irwin Cotler, Iran's Incitement to Genocide Can't Be Treated as Bombast, NAT'L POST
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Among its myriad variants, Holocaust inversion includes portraying
Jews-especially Israeli Jews-as Nazis, crypto-Nazis, Nazi
sympathizers, Holocaust perpetrators, or Holocaust "copycats." 20 As a
category of "Holocaust distortion," inversion is distinguished in part
from such kindred practices as Holocaust denial, minimization, and
trivialization by its precisely targeted offensive usage-such as its
tendency not only to disarm but to accuse. Several agencies and
commentators have characterized Holocaust inversion not only as a
form of anti-Semitism but also as a primary criterion by which
contemporary anti-Semitism can be discerned. 12 1 For example, the

(Canada) (Dec. 5, 2008), http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2008/
12/05/irwin-cotler-iran-s-incitement-of-genocide-can-t-be-treated-as-bombast.aspx.
119. WISTRICH. supra note 110, at 885. Such exhortations may constitute incitement to
genocide. See, e.g., Incitement to Indictment?, supra note 6, at 864-68 (commenting that
Ahmadinejad's hostile public statements about Israel, Jews, and the Holocaust can be "divided
into seven categories: (1) calling for Israel's destruction (2) predicting Israel's destruction (3)
dehumanizing Israeli Jews; (4) accusing Israel of perpetrating mass murder; (5) condoning past
violence against Israel and issuing threats against those who would protect Israel; (6) advocating
expulsion of Israeli Jews from the Middle East: and (7) denying the Holocaust"); Marcus. Iran's
Nuclear Anti-Zionism, supra note 116; DAVID MATAS ET AL., B'NAI BRITH CAN., INDICTMENT
OF IRANIAN PRESIDENT MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD FOR INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE

AGAINST THE JEWISH PEOPLE (2007). available at http://www.bnaibrith.ca/pdf/institute/
IndictmentlranianPresidentMarch07.pdf (illustrating Jewish organization B'nai Brith's request
that Canada prosecute President Ahmadinejad for inciting genocide against the Jewish people).
Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of the Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah made the genocidal
element in such declarations more explicit when he explained in 2006, "If Jews all gather in
Israel, it will save us the trouble of going after them worldwide." Elena Lappin, The Enemy
Within, N.Y. TIMES. May 23, 2004, at V15. Nasrallah calls for "an open war until the elimination
of Israel and until the death of the last Jew on earth." Michael Rubin, Aasrallah Urges Arabs to
Evacuate Haifa, NAT'L REVIEW ONLINE (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/ 126871 /nasrallah-urges-arabs-evacuate-haifa/michael-rubin.
120. In his useful taxonomy of Holocaust distortion. Manfred Gerstenfeld has catalogued
eleven distinct forms:
Holocaust Promotion; Holocaust Denial; Holocaust Depreciation;
Holocaust Deflection; Holocaust Inversion: Prewar and Wartime Holocaust Equivalence; Postwar
Holocaust Equivalence: Accusations of Jewish Holocaust-Memory Abuse; Obliterating the
Holocaust Memory; Holocaust-Memory Silencing; and Universalizing/Trivializing the Holocaust.
Manfred Gerstenfeld, The Multiple Distortions of Holocaust Memory, 19 JEWISH POL. STUD.
REV. 3-4 (2007).
121.

See, e.g., BERNARD HARRISON, AM. JEWISH COMM., ISRAEL, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND

FREE SPEECH 22-23 (2007) (discussing how the "Nazi Analogy" is factually flawed and how the
use of the analogy absent circumstances more akin to the Holocaust makes it a mere abusive
epithet of anti-Semitism, not a "serious political point"); Howard Jacobson, Wordsmiths and
Atrocities Against Language: The Incendiary Use of the Holocaust and Nazism Against Jews, in
A NEW ANTISEMITISM? DEBATING JUDEOPHOBIA IN 21ST CENTURY BRITAIN 102 (P. Iganski &

B. Kosmin eds., 2003) (criticizing other authors for their "stupidity" for equating Zionism with
Nazism): U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT ON GLOBAL ANTI-SEMITISM
Definition of Antisemitism. EUROPEAN FORUM ON ANTISEMITISM

1 (2005); Working
(Mar. 16, 2005).

http://www.european-forum-on-antisemitism.org/working-definition-of-antisemitism/english/
(providing a contemporary example of anti-Semitism by examining how in certain countries in
the Middle East the media has publicized "comparisons of Israeli leaders to Hitler and the Nazis"
without government response, whereas in other countries, such as France and Germany, laws that
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European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia's ("EUMC")
authoritativel 2 2 working definition of anti-Semitism correctly
characterizes Holocaust inversion as a discrete form of anti-Semitism.
Analogous practices have been used with other groups as well. For
example, Des Forges observed that Mugesera and Ngeze (in Kangura)
explicitly tried to connect the Tutsis with the Nazis in the course of
employing AiM. 123 The irony in this tactic, as Des Forges recognized,
is that it is the Hutu perpetrators who may have been admirers of Hitler
and Nazi Germany.1 24 Indeed, films about Hitler and Nazism were
found in the residence of Rwandan President Juv6nal Habyarimana after
he was assassinated in April 1994.125 Similarly, Holocaust inversion
appears more deeply ironic in the face of documented collaboration,
including genocidal conspiracy 26 between the Nazi regime and the
Palestinian leadership of the Holocaust era.127 The continuing influence
of Nazi propaganda can be seen in the anti-Semitic doctrines of
extremist Islam from World War ITto the present day. 128

punish those who publicly equate Israel with Nazism have been promoted).
122. The influence of this definition, and particularly of its examples, can be seen in its rapid
international adoption. See, e.g.. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE. CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL ANTISEMITISM 6-7 (2008) ("[E]xamples of the ways in which anti-Semitism manifests itself with
regard to the state of Israel taking into account the overall context could include: ... [d]rawing
comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis . . . ."); ALL-PARTY
PARLIAMENTARY
GROUP
AGAINST
ANTISEMITISM,
REPORT
OF
THE ALL-PARTY
PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO ANTISEMITISM 5 (2006) (recommending the adoption of the

EUMC's working definition). Increased international adoption of this definition is a goal of the
2009 London Declaration on Combating Antisemitism and the 2010 Ottawa Protocol of the
Interparliamentary Coalition to Combat Antisemitism.
123. DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 79-81.
124. Id.
I25. Id.
126. See KLAUS-MICHAEL MALLMANN & MARTIN COPPERS, NAZI PALESTINE: THE
PLANS FOR THE EXTERMINATION OF THE JEWS IN PALESTINE (Krista Smith. trans.. 2010)
(examining the relations between the Third Reich in Germany and Arab nationalists and positing
the two shared common schemes to eradicate Jews).
127. See, e.g., MATTHIAS KUNTZEL, JIHAD AND JEW-HATRED: ISLAMISM, NAZISM AND
THE ROOTS OF 9/11 (C. Meade trans., 2007) (documenting Nazi collaboration with Palestinian
leadership and continuing influence of Nazi propaganda on extremist elements within Islamist
movement).
128.

See, e.g.. JEFFREY HERF.

NAZI PROPAGANDA AND THE ARAB WORLD (2009)

(recounting the influence of Nazi propaganda on the development of anti-Semitic doctrines within
extremist elements of the Islamic world); PAUL BERMAN. THE FLIGHT OF THE
INTELLECTUALS (2010) (analyzing the continuing influence of Nazi anti-Semitism within radical
Islam).
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EFFECTIVENESS

A. Effectiveness as a Means of FacilitatingPersecution
Despite its evident drawbacks, AiM has turned out to be
extraordinarily effective. As Catharine MacKinnon observed of one
case before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, "This
infamous 'accusation in a mirror'-the propaganda technique in which
one side falsely attributes attacks to the other in order to justify
retaliation in kind, casting aggression as self-defense-was especially
causally potent."l 2 9 That is to say, the use of AiM has a direct causal
effect on the perpetration of genocide. Similarly, Des Forges explained
that this tactic was used quite effectively both in specific incidents, such
as the March 1992 Bugesera massacre and also more generally in the
propaganda campaign to convince Hutu to rise up against the Tutsi and
to exterminate them. 130
The Hutu officials and propagandists
repeatedly employed the Note's techniques, even if it cannot be proven
that that they were personally familiar with the actual document. 13 1
The technique's effectiveness is poignantly described by Coptic
activist Mounir Bishai, who describes the manner in which his
community has recently been subjected to abuse in Egypt:
Suddenly we have shifted from complaints to self-defense, from
demanding [our] rights to [trying to] convince the public that we are
not depriving others of their rights. . . Before [Hurricane] Fitna we
were known as the weak and attacked [party], and now we are being

accused of amassing weapons... How have we suddenly turned from
persecuted into persecutors, from the weak [party] into the strong and
tyrannical [one], from the attacked [party] into the infamous attackers,
and from the poor [party] into the rich exploiters? How did these lies
become widespread, without us gaining any ground or improving our
situation one whit? ... 132
The answer to Bishai's lament has been the rhetorical effectiveness of
AiM.
In order to fully understand AiM's effectiveness, however, one must
identify each of the functions that it plays. The effectiveness is most
frequently addressed in terms of its legitimizing function, but, in fact, it
serves at least five other primary functions, each of which must be

129.
Ngeze.
130.
131.

Catharine MacKinnon, InternationalDecisions: Prosecutor v. Nahimana. Barayagwiza &
98 Am. J. INT'L L. 325. 330 (2004).
DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 66.
Id.
132. L. AzuRI, MEMRI, INQUIRY & ANALYSIS SERIES REPORT No.646, RISING TENSIONS

BETWEEN MUSLIMS. CHRISTIANS IN EGYPT (Nov. 15. 2010). available at http://www.memri.org/

report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4765.htm.
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understood to fully appreciate the extent to which it can serve as an
effective form of incitement.
B. Functions in FacilitatingPersecution
AiM has six interrelated functions: to shock, to silence, to threaten, to
insulate, to legitimize, and, finally, to motivate or incite. 133 First and
most unmistakably, it is shocking, even when it is frequently repeated,
which is why it is frequently repeated. No one tells Holocaust
survivors-or a nation of Holocaust survivors and their children-that
they are Nazis without expecting to shock. The same can be said of the
inversive accusations leveled at Bosnians, Tutsis, and Copts.
But AiM is shocking in a particular manner-a manner that tends to
silence. As Charles Lawrence has explained, the visceral "[fjear, rage,
[and] shock" of hate speech systematically preempts response.134
Lawrence wrote about hate speech expressed in the United States
against African Americans and other American minorities, but his
observations are also applicable to other groups that have experienced
human rights inversion. Given the sensitivity of many Jews to issues
concerning the Shoah, for example, Holocaust inversions have the
power not only to shock, but also to silence expression of Jewish
viewpoints, including speech sympathetic to the State of Israel. 13 5
Moreover, the stereotype of Jewish conspiratorial power, combined
with the use of Nazi motifs, has a peculiarly chilling effect. As activist
Melanie Kaye-Kantrowitz explains, it "mutes our loud, proud Jewish
energy, make[s] us afraid of seeming too powerful, too ... well, Jewish.
How can we fight injustice powerfully if we fear our power?" 36 The
silencing function of inciteful speech is worth noting in light of the
inevitable claims that those who oppose hate speech are the silencers. 137
Beyond silencing, AiM is also threatening. It is threatening, because
the ascription of guilt carries with it the threat of punishment. For
example, this can be seen in the warning that Jewish students at the
University of California at Irvine recently received from one recent
campus speaker who said, "[I]t's time for you to live in some fear now

133.

See KENNETH L. MARCUS. JEWISH IDENTITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICA 63-64

(2010) (introducing most of these functions).
134. Charles R. Lawrence I, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 452.
135. The point is amplified in Kenneth L. Marcus, HigherEducation, Harassment, and First
Amendment Opportunism, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1025, 1050-52 (2008).
136. Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz, Some Notes on Anti-Semitism from a Progressive Jewish
Perspective, JEWISH CURRENTS (Mar. 2007), http://wwwjewishcurrents.org/2007-markayekantrowiz.htm.
137. See JEWISH IDENTITY, supra note 133, at 71 75 (analyzing such claims).
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because you were so good at dispensing fear."l 38 Significantly, it is not
only the target group that is threatened by such forms of expressive
conduct, but also bystanders who might be dissuaded from supporting
the out-group.1 39
AiM's threatening function is also apparent in the United States's sad
history of lynching. By the most conservative estimates, the proportion
of black victims lynched for purportedly rape-related offenses varied
between 26.7% and 40.6%, but some authorities suggest that in

Georgia, sexual allegations were associated with more than 60% of
lynchings between 1880 and 1889 and approximately half of all
lynchings.1 40 Moreover, when black men were accused of raping
women, the difference between lynching and "regular" justice was
sometimes more a matter of form than of substance. 14 1 Indeed, "guilt or
innocence was often beside the point when southern blacks were
accused of . .. sexually assaulting white women." 1 4 2
Nevertheless, AiM is presented in a manner that is frequently
immune from criticism because its political guise is insulting. The
insulting function provides a means by which animus can be expressed
without provoking the resistance that post-World War 11 racism tends to
precipitate.
Like other contemporary hate and bias modalities,
Holocaust inversion has been protected from normal anti-discrimination
enforcement by its ability to replicate or mimic the tropes of a dissident
political discourse. This masking effect has permitted the growth and
dissemination of hate and bias that would otherwise be checked by
138. Letter from Charles R. Love, Program Manager, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Office for Civil
Rights, Region IX, to Dr. Michael V. Drake. Chancellor. Univ. of Cali., Irvine. In re OCR Case
No. 09-05-2013 (Nov. 30. 2007) [hereinafter In re University of California at Irvine, OCR Case
No. 09-05-2013], available at http://www.ocregister.com/newsimages/news/2007/12/OCR
Report 120507-ZO5145157-0001.pdf (quoting an unnamed campus speaker). In this case, the
speaker taunted. "You were so good at making people think that y'all was all that and the Islamic
tide started coming up." Id. For a discussion of the Irvine case, see JEWISH IDENTITY, supra
note 133 and Kenneth L. Marcus, Jurisprudence of the New Anti-Semitism. 44 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 371, 383-93 (2009). The Israelis-as-Nazis analogy serves to justify not only anti-Israeli.
but also anti-Jewish activity, which is otherwise socially or legally repelled. In light of the social
stigma associated with anti-Semitism and racism, inversion serves to legitimate prejudice that
would otherwise be socially unacceptable. In many cases, Holocaust inversion is coupled with
suggestions that Jews should be treated in a manner consistent with their putative status as
genocidal criminals. This particular quotation is taken from the official report of the U.S.
Department of Education. Office for Civil Rights and investigation into charges of unlawful antiSemitic harassment at the University of California at Irvine.
139. See STEVEN K. BAUM, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE: PERPETRATORS.
BYSTANDERS AND RESCUERS 119 (2008) (noting that even if 80% of community members
may be compassionate and caring, a vocal 20% biased minority may nevertheless intimidate the
rest of the community).
140. SOMMERVILLE. supra note 98, at223.
141. FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 118.
142. KLARMAN, supra note 102, at 118.
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various social, political, administrative, and legal controls, including
human and civil rights law.
More significantly, AiM is legitimizing. In the genocidal context,
AiM's legitimizing function is particularly important because of the
enormity of the crime that must be justified. Des Forges has observed
that "[w]ith such a tactic, propagandists can persuade listeners and
'honest people' that they are being attacked and are justified in taking
whatever measures are necessary 'for legitimate [self-]defense."' 43 As
Joseph Goebbels put it, "The Jews are guilty [and] the punishment is
coming." Similarly, Heinrich Himmler, Reichsftihrer of the SS, argued
that "we had the moral right vis-a-vis our people to annihilate this
people which wanted to annihilate us."l 4 4 AiM has served the same
function in a wide range of contexts, whether the victims' purported
crimes are contemporaneous (as with the "black racist"), prospective
("Tutsi exterminators"), or retrospective ("Zionist Holocaust").
In the mind of Southern racists, the myth of the black rapist served to
legitimize Jim Crow lynchings. Similarly, it provided the Nazis with a
justification for their murder of the Jews. In the same way, Hutu claims
of Tutsi aggression "legitimized" the violence that Hutus would visit
upon them. For example, Mugesera warned his Hutu countrymen,
"[K]now that anyone whose neck you do not cut is the one who will cut
your neck. "i45
Thus, as Susan Benesch explains, the propagandist understood at
least one aspect of genocide inversion's legitimizing function: it
provides a collective self-defense justification for mass atrocities in the
same way that individual self-defense provides a defense against the
crime of murder.146 Even in its legitimizing function, however,
genocide inversion does more than provide a prospective defense
against subsequent charges. Beyond such persuasion, AiM also
functions as a means of constructing the identity of a despised other. In
the simplest sense, genocide AiM may be, as Benesch has defined it, the
technique of "claim[ing] (falsely) that the victims-to-be are planning to
commit atrocities against the genocidaires-to-be."l 4 7 In a broader sense,
however, it is not merely a set of explicit claims, but rather a practice of
constructing the other in a particular manner. Specifically, genocide
inversion consists of constructing an identifiable other as so deeply and
ineradicably criminal as to justify and even to require extermination
143. DES FORGES, supra note 1, at 58
144. Id.
145. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2003), [2004] 1 F.C. 325
(Can. Que. Fed. Ct. App.).
146. Id.
147. Benesch, supra note 6, at 504.
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precisely because the drive to exterminate is so central within the
constructed self of the other.
Finally, AiM is motivating or inciting. That is to say, AiM not only
provides a reason or justification for aggression, as other less effective
forms of incitement also do; more insidiously, it also communicates to
the listener that it is necessary to attack another group in order to avoid
having the same fate visited upon one's own community. As Benesch
has explained, other rhetorical techniques such as demonization can
make mass-murder seem acceptable, but AiM makes it appear
necessary.14 8 This function follows in part from the functions described
above but also goes beyond them. Although this motivating quality is
useful in lesser forms of incitement, it is critical to those who are
inciting genocide because these perpetrators must overcome the strong
social prohibitions on such heinous deeds.1 49
AiM is able to
accomplish this by redefining the target population as being guilty of
such a vile transgression as to lie outside the scope of mutual
obligations and lawful protections.15 0 In his most infamous speech,
Mugesera repeatedly claimed that the "inyenzi" planned to commit
genocide against the Hutu: "These people called Inyenzis are now on
their way to attack us . . . I am telling you, and I am not lying [that] ...
they only want to exterminate us. They only want to exterminate us:
they have no other aim." 15 1 Mugesera used this form of AiM precisely
because he understood its motivating quality: "Are we really waiting till
they come to exterminate us?" Mugesera demanded. 15 2
Similarly, Bernard-Henri L6vy argues that Holocaust inversion,
together with other elements of the "new anti-Semitism," erodes the
inhibitions that have, for several decades, prevented most Europeans
from wanting to exterminate Jews. 153 Such defamations enable "people
to feel once again the desire and, above all, the right to burn all the
synagogues they want, to attack boys wearing yarmulkes, to harass
large numbers of rabbis, to kill not just one but many Ilan Halimis-in
in order for anti-Semitism to be reborn on a large scale."l5 4 The
directness of AiM can be seen, not only in its common usage, but in the
effectiveness with which it accomplishes its intention.
Most

148.

Id. at 506.

149. Id. at 486 (quoting FRANK CHALK
SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 28 (1990)).

& KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND

150. Id.
151. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] S.C.R. 100, 93
paras. 16. 18 (Can.).
152. Id. para. 49.
153. BERNARD-HENRI LEVY, LEFT IN DARK TIMES 155 (Benjamin Moser trans., 2008).
154. Id.
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importantly, AiM motivates people to commit precisely the
transgressions that are falsely attributed to the victim group. This is
particularly important in the case of heinous crimes such as genocide,
which require powerful motivation to overcome strong social bonds.
But it can also explain the way in which large numbers of people are
induced to engage in other forms of persecution, such as the systematic
rape of black women during the Jim Crow South or the United States
government's callous disregard for the rights of Indians during the Trail
of Tears. This direct motivation is, moreover, only one facet of the
complex efficacy through which AiM aids perpetrators in subjecting
target populations for persecution or destruction. In fulfilling the range
of functions described above, AiM facilitates aggression against its
victims with peculiar effectiveness. For this additional reason, the use
of AiM in genocidal or non-genocidal contexts cannot reasonably be
viewed as being anything but direct.
C. PsychologicalFunctions
A full assessment of AiM's effectiveness must acknowledge that the
technique serves important psychological functions for the speaker as
well as critical functions for the speaker's party. In this sense, the
widespread use of AiM results not only from its effectiveness at
facilitating persecution, up to and including genocide, but also because
AiM fulfills independent psychological needs of the perpetrators who
use it.

First, there is no phenomenon that better exemplifies the defense
mechanism that prejudice, classically, has been understood to provide.
"Projection" is the process of displacing unwanted feelings onto
despised others, who may then appear to be external threats."' While
projection has been explained as a source of all prejudice, including
anti-Semitism, it is never more conspicuous than when it takes the form
of AiM.15 6
Second, AiM is a paradigmatic form of what might be called
"secondary prejudice." Secondary prejudice is any form of bias that is
itself a reflection of the taboo of open bigotry.1 57 For example, the
European Union's Agency for Fundamental Rights ("FRA") recently
noted that "secondary anti-Semitism" could be most broadly defined as
155. AVNER FALK, ANTI-SEMITISM: A HISTORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS OF
CONTEMPORARY HATRED (2008) 67, 71-72. 83 (discussing the possible roots behind the
psychological projections that Christians place on Jews that manifest into anti-Semitism).

156. Id.
157. Clemens Heni, Secondary Anti-Semitism: From Hard-Core to Soft-Core Denial of the
Shoah. 20 JEWISH POL. STUD. REv. 3-4 (2008). available at http://wwwjcpa.org/JCPA/
Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID= I&LNGID= &TMID= II &FID=625&PID=0&IID=2675.
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"any form of anti-Semitism that is in itself a reflection of the taboo of
'open anti-Semitism."'1 5 8 Peter Schanbach, a colleague of leading
Frankfurt School scholar Theodor Adorno, coined the increasingly used
concept of "secondary anti-Semitism." The classic example, prevalent
in post-War Germany and Austria, is the claim that Jews were
responsible for the Holocaust. 159 "Rather than constituting a form of
anti-Semitism that exists in spite of the history of National Socialism,"
the FRA explains, "it exists because of it."l 60 In one pointed
formulation, "The Germans will never forgive the Jews for
Auschwitz."1 6 1
Secondary prejudice is often directed at other persecuted groups as
well. For example, Jim Crow laws reflected the South's refusal to
forgive blacks for the sin of slavery. Similarly, when heterosexual
majorities deny certain rights or privileges, such as marriage, to gays
and lesbians-and then accuse gay rights activists of seeking "special
privileges"-they are engaging in AiM. These attitudes can be
described as a secondary prejudice because, to a certain extent, the
resentment that these majorities experience arises from subconscious
shame for their treatment of a disadvantaged minority. In general,
secondary prejudice arises from the guilt or shame that non-minority
groups experience in the face of their own present or prior hate or bias.

IV.

ACCUSATION IN A MIRROR AND GENOCIDE LAW DOCTRINE

A. The DoctrinalSignificance ofAccusation in a Mirror
AiM is a primary form of incitement, like demonization and
dehumanization, which can be used to show the "directness" of
expressive conduct that intuitively might appear indirect.162 The
Genocide Convention criminalizes "direct and public incitement to
commit genocide,"l 6 3 regardless of whether actual genocide results. 164
Under the Genocide Convention, incitement is an autonomous
infraction that-like conspiracy-constitutes an inchoate crime, in the
158. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Anti-Semitism: Summary overview of
the situation in the European Union 2001 2010, at 25 (Apr. 2011) (FRA working paper),
available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/AntisemitismUpdate 2011 .pdf.
159. Id.

160. Id.
161. Ben Weinthal, The Raging Bronx Bull of German Journalism, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD
(June 8, 2007). http://www.forward.com/articles/10874/ (quoting psychologist Zvi Rex).
162. The importance of accusation in a mirror to incitement law is discussed in Music and
Genocide, supra note 6, at 638; Benesch, supra note 6, at 504-06.
163. G.A. Res. 260 (III), at 174, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., A/810 (Part 1) (Dec. 9, 1948).
164. The key point that actual violence need not be shown was authoritatively established in
the Media Case. Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. 1CTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, n.26, W
720 (Nov. 28, 2007), affg Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 1015.
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sense that the result need not be proven, as long as the incitement was
direct and public, as well as intentional, with the intent to destroy a
protected group completely or partially.1 65
The conundrum for
genocide law is that incitement doctrine is squeezed between two
imperatives: on the one hand, the need to distinguish between genocidal
incitement and ordinary hate speech and, on the other hand, the need to
address genocidal incitement before it results in murder. By identifying
primary incitement techniques, such as AiM, courts can satisfy the latter
imperative while still respecting the former.
B. Accusation in a Mirrorand the Elements ofIncitement
Gregory Gordon has performed the admirable task of elucidating the
criteria that actionable incitement must meet under modern genocide
law.166 First, the statements in question must be publicly uttered. 167
Needless to say, AiM may be used publicly or privately. For purposes
of applying genocide law, only public utterances are at issue here.
Second, and most importantly for present purposes, actionable
statements must be uttered in a sufficiently direct manner. 168 The
Genocide Convention and related authorities do not prohibit casual or
indirect utterances, nor do they provide a general prohibition on hate
speech.1 69 As further discussed below, the legally critical aspect of
AiM is that it is a substantively direct form of incitement
notwithstanding the indirect appearance that it sometimes assumes.
Third, the utterance must be actual incitement rather than protected
speech.1 70 This criterion overlaps considerably with the directness
element, since the directness requirement is intended in no small part to
distinguish protected speech from punishable incitement. The two
criteria can be distinguished for certain analytical purposes, however,
because the directness requirement should also be understood as a
creature of contemporary values regarding the freedom of speech.
Finally, an actionable statement must have an underlying intent to
provoke mass-murder. 17 1 This is an important independent requirement
that must be satisfied even in cases of AiM. Some advocates might
argue that the mirror itself can reveal the speaker's intent, but this is too
165. Schabas. supra note 15, at 149.
166. Gordon bases his analysis largely on the ICTR cases, which have been relatively detailed
in their analysis, since the applicable statute mirrors the Genoicde Convention. Incitement to
Indictment?, supra note 6, at 869-70.
167. Id. at 870.
16 8. Id.
169. Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor v.
Nahimana, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 557, 566 (2006).
170. Incitement to Indictment?, supra note 6, at 869-70.
17 1. Id.
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facile. As explained in Part II, AiM can be used consciously or
unconsciously and therefore can be either a deliberate propagandistic
technique or an expression of unconscious projection.1 72 To the extent
that AiM is used in an unconscious manner, its communicative process
is no less direct, but it would be inaccurate to characterize what it
reveals as the speaker's "intent." In genocide cases, the directness is
not sufficient to provide a basis for prosecution without the presence of
intent.
C. Accusation in a Mirroras Evidence ofDirectness
Given the importance of protecting the freedom of speech,1 73 Courts
have been appropriately cautious in ensuring that only direct
incitements be proscribed.1 74 Unfortunately it is often difficult to
determine what expressions may be deemed sufficiently direct in light
of the covert, coded, and euphemistic manner in which genocidal
appeals are generally communicated. 175 This is a serious problem
because the Genocide Convention is intended to prevent genocides
before they occur and not merely to punish the perpetrators after the
killing is done.1 76

172. See infra Part II (discussing how AiM, "while sometimes a deliberate propagandistic
tactic, also sometimes expresses an unconscious impulse" by examining the Nazi and Rwandan
genocides and the myths of the Indian giver, black racist, and murderous Jew).
173. Indeed, the United States was initially reluctant to enter into the Genocide Convention
for reasons relating to the freedom of speech. See Continuation of the Consideration of the Draft
Convention on Genocide [E/794]: Report of the Economic and Social Council [A/633]. U.N.
GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 84th mtg. at 213 (1948) (discussing the debates over whether or not
to include incitement to genocide within the list of punishable acts). When the U.S. Senate
finally ratified the Genocide Convention, after decades of debate, it did so only with this
reservation: "Nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the
United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the
United States." 132 CoNG. REC. S1252-54 (daily ed. Feb. 18. 1986) (Lugar/Helms/Hatch
Reservations to the Genocide Convention).
174. U.S. courts have been similarly cautious, requiring a "directness" element in domestic
incitement cases. Compare, e.g., Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)
("[I]ndirect result of the language might be to arouse a seditious disposition, [however, this]
would not be enough . . . ?"), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d. Cir. 1917) with Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul
Akayesu, Judgment. ICTR-96-4-T, 557 (1998) ("[M]ore than mere vague or indirect suggestion
[is required to] constitute direct incitement."). Such comparisons are usefully explored in Ameer
F. Gopalani, The InternationalStandard of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide:
An Obstacle to U.S. Ratification of the InternationalCriminal Court Statute?. 32 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 87, 102-04 (2001).
175. See Schabas, supra note 15, at 160 ("The problem with the requirement that incitement
be 'direct' is that history shows that those who attempt to incite genocide speak in euphemisms.
It would surely be contrary to the intent of the drafters to view such coded language as being
insufficiently direct.").
176. Michael P. Scharf & Brianne M. Draffin. Foreword: To Prevent and to Punish: An
International Conference in Commemoration of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Genocide
Convention, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2007).
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Sadly, for reasons that are both legal and political,1 77 the Genocide
Convention has failed to prevent or appreciably reduce the incidents of
mass-killings.1 78 The Genocide Convention's passage has been justly
characterized as "utterly irrelevant" when the first half century
following its passage witnessed the slaughter of four million by Stalin's
Russia, five million in Mao's Chinese Cultural Revolution, two million
in Pol Pot's killing field, 750,000 in Uganda, etc.179 This abject failure
prompted the United Nation's High Commissioner for Human Rights to
lament: "A person stands a better chance of being tried and judged for
killing one human being than for killing 100,000."io In recent years,
the U.N. has committed to correcting this sorry history, for example, by
adopting its Responsibility to Protect doctrine.181 If the Genocide
Convention is to merit its designation as the "Never Again" treaty, its
incitement provisions must be interpreted in ways that effectuate its
intent to prevent further tragedies. At a minimum this requires that
judicial bodies properly recognize the forms that incitement to genocide
habitually assume so that they can be properly addressed.
Given the frequency with which genocidal AiM presages actual
genocide, courts and tribunals must attribute proper significance to this
form of incitement. At a minimum, this requires an appreciation that
AiM is generally understood in pre-genocidal and genocidal contexts as
a direct call to commit mass-murder, whether it is accompanied by other
more explicit exhortations or not. This is important, because courts
have taken the directness requirement of incitement seriously. For
example, the Mugesera court cautioned that an equivocal speech, open
to differing interpretations, could not constitute direct and public
incitement to commit genocide.182 Mugesera's teaching that actionable
incitement must be a direct appeal to commit an act of genocide,18 3

177. See generally SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE
AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002) (discussing why American leaders frequently promise to prevent
genocide yet repeatedly fail to do so).
178. See Scharf & Draffin, supra note 176, at 2 (describing the Genocide Convention's failure
to prevent genocide even after it was established).
179. Id.
180.

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE INTERNATIONAL WAR

CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG xiv (1997).
181. Scharf& Draffin, supra note 176, at 4; see also Paul R. Williams & Meghan E. Stewart.
Humanitarian Intervention: The New Missing Link in the Fight to Prevent Crimes Against
Humanity and Genocide?, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 97, 105-06 (2008) (elucidating the
responsibility to protect. or "R2P"); David Scheffer, Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility
to Protect, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 11(2008) (drawing lines for determining which atrocity
crimes merit application of the R2P doctrine and which do not).
182. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2003). [2004] F.C. 325
(Can.).
183. Id.
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rather than a vague advocacy of hate or discrimination, has been
influential.1 84 Furthermore, the Media Case, carefully distinguished
between direct incitements and most other forms of hate speech:
Direct incitement to commit genocide assumes that the speech is a
direct appeal to commit an act referred to in Article 2(2) of the Statute;

it has to be more than a mere vague or indirect suggestion. In most
cases, direct and public incitement to commit genocide can be
preceded or accompanied by hate speech, but only direct and public
incitement to commit genocide is prohibited under Article 2(3)(c) of
the Statute.1 85
Genocidal AiM is inciteful not because it is hate speech, but because
it is in fact-if not in form-an appeal to commit particular acts. In the
Media Case, the appeals court emphasized that while genocide is often
preceded by or coupled with hate speech, hate speech is not per se
actionable unless it directly calls for the commission of genocide.18 6
Similarly, the International Law Commission explained, "The element
of direct incitement requires specifically urging another individual to
take immediate criminal action rather than merely making a vague or
indirect suggestion." 87
The meaning of coded speech may, however, be unequivocal. That is
to say, its meaning may be clear and definite when it is properly
decoded. In such cases, its meaning may be well understood to its
listeners. It is now well established that the directness element must be
"viewed in the light of its cultural and linguistic content." 8 8 Whether a
particular communication can be considered direct will vary depending
on local linguistic contexts. Most importantly, it is a basic principle of
genocide law that "incitement may be direct, and nonetheless
implicit." 8 9
The value of AiM, as a legal concept, is that it provides a means of
understanding how a major category of coded speech can meet the
directness element under the Genocide Convention and other laws
prohibiting incitement to genocide.
The Genocide Convention
criminalizes "direct and public incitement to commit genocide." 190 The
184. See George William Mugwanya, Recent Trends in International Criminal Law:
Perspectives from the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 6 Nw. U. J. INTL
HUM. RTS. 415. 436 (2008) (describing influence of Mugesera on lCTR decisions).
185. Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, n.26, 693 (Nov.
28, 2007); Mugwanya, supra note 184, at 437.
186. Nahimana Judgment, ICTR-99-52-A,
693 (Nov. 28. 2007); Mugwanya. supra note
184, at 437.
187. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 48th Sess. May 6 July 26, 1996, at 22, U.N. Doc.
A/51/10; GAOR 51st Sess.. Supp. No. 10 (1996).
188. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. 1CTR 96-4-T. Judgment, 557 (Sept. 2, 1998).
18 9.

Id.

190.

Genocide Convention, supra note 2.
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Convention makes genocidal incitement an inchoate crime, in the sense
that actual genocide need not occur for its incitement to be
actionable.191 Nevertheless, actionable incitement must be a direct
appeal to commit an act of genocide rather than vague hate speech.1 92
"Directness" is often difficult to discern in light of the covert, coded,
and euphemistic manner in which genocidal appeals are generally
communicated.1 93 At the same time, it is critical for judicial bodies to
recognize incitement, even when it takes such forms, because otherwise
they will fail to satisfy the Genocide Convention's purpose of
preventing genocide rather than merely punishing its perpetrators.1 94
At first blush, AiM appears to be entirely indirect. The speaker need
not urge the target audience to take any particular course of conduct;
moreover, if any actions are urged, they are veiled in the language of
self-defense.
Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, the "directness"
requirement is not construed formalistically to require an explicit
exhortation, since that is not the form that genocidal incitement
characteristically takes. Indeed, genocide law cannot succeed in
preventing mass-killings-as opposed to punishing their perpetrators
after the fact-unless incitement doctrine is construed broadly to
encompass such ways in which genocidaires actually ply their craft.
For this reason, "directness" is interpreted contextually to require a
communication that reasonable listeners would understand-within
local conditions-as an appeal to undertake certain actions. As the
Rwanda tribunal has explained, "The Chamber will therefore consider
on a case-by-case basis whether, in light of the culture of Rwanda and
the specific circumstances of the instant case, acts of incitement can be
viewed as direct or not, by focusing mainly on the issue of whether the
persons for whom the message was intended immediately grasped the
implication thereof."1 9 5 The Rwandan example demonstrates the clarity
with which implicit directives contained within AiM are understood and
executed.
In this sense, the directness element should be considered satisfied
when it can be shown that a defendant has publicly accused a particular
vulnerable population of genocidal practices, or genocidal intent, in a

191. Schabas, supra note 15, at 149.
192. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] S.C.R. 100
(Can.).
193. See Schabas. supra note 15. at 160 ("The problem with the requirement that incitement
be 'direct' is that history shows that those who attempt to incite genocide speak in euphemisms. It
would surely be contrary to the intent of the drafters to view such coded language as being
insufficiently direct.").
194. Scharf & Draffin, supra note 176, at 4.
195. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 558 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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manner that mirrors practices that have been directed against them.
This approach does not push the boundaries impermissibly between
incitement and hate speech. This is important not only because
domestic constitutional considerations sometimes apply,196 but also
because the Genocide Convention's history indicates an "unambiguous
determination" by the Convention's drafters to exclude hate speech
from the scope of the clause that criminalizes "direct and public
incitement to commit genocide." 9 7 This approach to AiM does not
criminalize speech that provokes hatred towards a protected group, but
instead punishes speech that advocates violence against members of the
group.19 8 Indeed, one of the defining features of AiM is that it does not
merely stoke generalized feelings of racial hatred; rather, it incites very
specific forms of criminal conduct.
This conclusion follows from the essentially euphemistic character
that incitement characteristically assumes. For this reason, other
commentators have recommended that euphemisms used to mask
incitement should be considered "kinds of incitement."1 9 9

V.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

This approach to AiM is more stringent than some alternative
approaches and less stringent than others. This Part will evaluate two
roads not taken here. One alternative would be to treat the use of AiM,
at least under some circumstances, as a chargeable offense. The other
would be to consider it to constitute (and not merely to satisfy) an
element that must be met in a prosecution for incitement. This Section
will argue that the former approach is too loose and the latter too
stringent.
A. Accusation in a Mirroras a Form of Incitement
This proposal is more stringent than an alternative approach that
would recognize AiM as a form of incitement to commit genocide per
196. See, e.g., Audrey Golden, Comment, Monkey Read, Monkey Do: Why the First
Amendment Should Not Protect the Printed Speech of an International Genocide Inciter, 43
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1149 (2008) (discussing the differences between international customary
law, under which genocide inciters would be found in violation of, and the U.S. Constitution,
under which genocide inciters would be protected under the First Amendment guaranteeing free
speech).
197. Diane F. Orentlicher, CriminalizingHate Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor v.
Nahimana, 12 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 17,22 28 (2005).
198. Id. at 39-40 (criticizing the ICTR for convicting defendants in the Media Case for crimes
against humanity based upon what she considered to be "speech that constitutes incitement to
racial hatred but not incitement to violence"); Incitement to Indictment?, supra note 6, at 910-11
(arguing that incitement to genocide can be distinguished from speech that merely encourages
racial hatred).
199. Incitement to Indictment?, supra note 6, at 857.
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se regardless of whether genocide actually ensures, as long as the basic
elements of genocide are met. For example, one commentator has
seemingly argued that AiM should be recognized as a "legally
chargeable form of incitement." 20 0 In other words, AiM should be
considered a category of chargeable offense rather than merely a
technique that satisfies only one element of the offense. 20 1
Thus, a person who specifically intends to motivate others to engage
in genocidal murder and furthers this plan by publicly and directly
accusing his or her would-be victims of genocidal intent, has committed
incitement to genocide. The virtue of recognizing this distinct category
of incitement is that it spares each adjudicator the burden of having to
determine in each instance whether this accusatory technique bears a
sufficient nexus to any actual or potential killing. The notion is that
certain forms of accusation are incitement per se.
This approach faces certain challenges, even aside from the usual
questions of expressive freedom that invariably surround the issue of
incitement. Can specific intent be inferred from the act itself, or must
one demonstrate that the accusation is motivated by genocidal intent?
Given the difficulty of proving intent, the tendency will be to infer it
from the circumstances in which the technique was used. This
inference is of limited persuasiveness, however. If the speaker urges the
elimination of a particular group at a time when members of that group
are notoriously being killed, one can infer that the speaker intends to
perpetuate the killing. But if the speaker merely accuses the victim
group of plotting similar crimes, can we assume that the speaker's intent
is similarly murderous?
The challenge of determining intent is
200. This approach greatly simplifies the analysis in Music and Genocide. supra note 6. at
638. Gordon's approach is much more sophisticated and nuanced than these quotations convey.
Indeed, when his three major works on this topic are taken together, it appears that Gordon might
consider AiM to be chargeable only when certain other criteria are satisfied and perhaps only
when it is anchored in some other form of incitement. For example, in some places Gordon
argues that AiM, to be chargeable, must be "anchored to direct calls" to genocide. Incitement to
Indictment?, supra note 6, at 857, which if taken literally almost seems to imply that accusation
in a mirror is not itself a form of incitement per se. A full presentation of the complexities of
Gordon's analysis would however exceed the scope of this Article.
201. Gordon's nine categories are:
(I) direct calls for destruction;
(2) predictions of destruction;
(3) verminization. pathologization. and demonization;
(4) accusation in a mirror;
(5) euphemisms and metaphors;
(6) justification during contemporaneous violence;
(7) condoning and congratulating past violence
(8) asking questions about violence: and
(9) victim-sympathizer conflation.
Id.
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exacerbated by the extent to which AiM often arises from the
subconscious process of "projection," rather than as a conscious
intention.
B. Accusation in a Mirroras an Element of Incitement
Susan Benesch argues, by contrast, that AiM supports an incitement
charge by demonstrating that the speaker not only dehumanized a target
population, but also justified mass-killing.2 02 In this way, AiM would
be a persuasive means of meeting one prong in the six-prong test that
Benesch has proposed in place of the current doctrinal framework.20 3
Specifically, it would provide an affirmative answer to the second half
of the first compound sentence in Benesch's fifth prong, which goes to
what has previously been identified as the requirement of
"effectiveness": Did the speaker describe the victims-to-be as
subhuman, or accuse them of plotting genocide? Had the audience been
conditioned by the use of these techniques in other, previous speech? 2 04
In other words, accusation is one of three techniques-together with
dehumanization and repetition-that can be used to demonstrate
effectiveness. In Benesch's scheme, prosecution must establish all six
elements in order to achieve a conviction. 20 5 Thus, under Benesch's
scheme, these three common techniques would effectively become an
element of the crime; no matter how directly and forcefully a public
speaker urges genocide, it would not be chargeable unless AiM or
dehumanization is used, unless the crowd has been primed by prior use
of these techniques. 20 6

202. Benesch, supra note 6, at 523-24.
203. The six prongs Benesch proposes to identify incitement to commit genocide and to
distinguish it from lawfully protected speech are as follows:
1. Was the speech understood by the audience as a call to genocide? Did it use
language, explicit or coded, to justify and promote violence?
2. Did the speaker have authority or influence over the audience and did the audience
have the capacity to commit genocide?
3. Had the victims-to-be already suffered an outbreak of recent violence?
4. Were contrasting views still available at the time of the speech? Was it still safe to
express them publicly?
5. Did the speaker describe the victims-to-be as subhuman, or accuse them of plotting
genocide? Had the audience been conditioned by the use of these techniques in other.
previous speech?
6. Had the audience received similar messages before the speech?
Id. at 498.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 520.
206. For substantially similar reasons, Gordon has argued that Benesch's six-prong test is too
rigid and has also criticized it on additional grounds. See Music and Genocide, supra note 6. at
626-30 (criticizing Benesch's test for failing to encompass scenarios that should pass the test,
such as a governmental official in a country experiencing inter-ethnic violence calling for the
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Since dehumanization is by no means universally used prior to the
commitment of genocide, this places an untenable burden on AiM. 20 7
Goldhagen has provided a rather lengthy list of genocidaires who have
not relied on dehumanization, including the Turks against Armenians
and Serbs against Bosnians. 20 8 In these forms of genocide, which do
not involve dehumanization, Benesch's scheme makes accusation a
necessary condition for incitement. This approach is far too rigid, as it
would exculpate non-dehumanizing genocidaires who do not use AiM.
In short, AiM cannot be an element of incitement, because this
requirement would be impracticably rigid. On the other hand, it cannot
constitute the crime of incitement per se, as this would be too lenient.
Rather, it should be considered a primary technique for incitement, and
its presence should satisfy the directness requirement, but other
elements of incitement must also be met for the statement to be
actionable.
VI. CONCLUSION

AiM is an extraordinary concept that deserves closer attention than it
has thus far received. First, AiM has been very commonly or frequently
employed, both in genocidal and non-genocidal contexts, and in widely
differing times and places. Second, AiM is strange or counter-intuitive:
of all of the false accusations that one might level at one's adversaries,
it is surprising that one would draw public attention to precisely the
misdeeds that one intends to commit. Third, despite these drawbacks,
AiM has had a famous potency, to use Catharine MacKinnon's term. 20 9
That is to say, it has been oddly effective in serving several functions,
including those observed by propagandists. Finally, for jurists, this
strangely effective and widespread phenomenon has a peculiar utility; to
wit: it provides a means by which prosecutors can demonstrate the
"directness," which is requisite to a showing of genocidal incitement.
AiM should be closely considered in incitement cases, not because it is
a necessary or a sufficient condition of incitement to genocide, as some
have suggested, but rather because it is strong evidence of directness.

ethnic majority to "go to work" on the ethnic minority, being too final as a "self-contained
universe" and containing ambiguous terms).
207. Goldhagen demonstrates that genocide is commonly accompanied by dehumanization,
demonization. or both. GOLDHAGEN. supra note 28, at 319-30.
208. Id. at 331.
209. MacKinnon, supra note 129, at 330.

